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Property vs. Liberty: Procedural law and practice of 
freedom trials in Portugal and Brazil 
 
Sven Korzilius1 
 
ABSTRACT: The article provides an overview of the historiographical debates on the 
relevance of law and courts for colonial slavery in the early modern, presenting several 
possible master narratives. Departing from the question about the legal sources used by 
the jurists of the early modern era producing “slave law in action”, the article focuses on 
procedural law of the freedom trials, especially on the interim situation of the person 
whose status the trial was about. This aspect of the proceedings is fascinating, because 
here the tension between the two extreme positions of the parties (liberty vs. 
slavery/property) is discharged for the first time. A close look at the sources proves that 
the jurists sought to justify the possible solutions not only with the custom of the courts 
(stilus curiae), but that a variety of legal formants contributed to colonial slave law, 
notably the authority of the Roman model, which the article presents shortly in its 
development, and of certain medieval forms, like the summariissimum or the actio (or 
execeptio) spolii. Legal doctrine was frequently quoted. As a result, Brazilian colonial 
slavery did not occur in a legal vacuum, but proves to have been highly institutionalized, 
and many aspects of the civil law of slavery appear as a relatively conservative 
continuation of European practice, without visible innovations to the favor or the 
detriment of the unfree population.  
Keywords: Law of slavery. Freedom trials. Interim measures. 
 
Propriedade vs. Liberdade. O direito processual e a prática das ações de liberdade em 
Portugal e Brasil 
 
RESUMO: O artigo fornece uma visão geral dos debates historiográficos sobre a 
relevância do direito e dos tribunais para a escravidão moderna, colonial, e apresenta 
diversas master narratives possíveis. Partindo da pergunta sobre as fontes jurídicas 
usadas pelos juristas da idade moderna ao produzir a law in action da escravidão, o 
artigo focaliza no direito processual das ações de liberdade, particularmente na situção 
interina da pessoa, cujo status foi objeto da lide. Esse aspecto do processo é tão 
fascinante, porque aqui a tensão entre as duas posições extremas das partes (liberdade 
vs. escravidão/propriedade) foi descarregada pela primeira vez no litígio. Um olhar 
atento nas fontes prova que os juristas buscaram de justificar as soluções possíveis não 
somente com o stilus curiae (o costume do poder judiciário), mas que um grande 
número de formantes contribuiu ao direito da escravidão colonial, nomeadamente o 
modelo romano com sua grande autoridade, que o artigo apresenta brevemente no seu 
desenvolvimento, e certas formas medievais, como o summariissimum ou a actio (ou 
execeptio) spolii. A doutrina foi frequentemente citada. Em consequência, a escravidão 
no Brasil colonial não aconteceu num vácuo jurídico, mas revela-se como altamente 
institucionalizada, e muitos aspectos do direito civil da escravidão aparecem como uma 
continuação relativamente conservadora da herança europeia, sem grandes inovações 
em favor ou em detrimento da população escrava. 
Palavras-chave: Direito da escravidão. Ações de liberdade. Medidas provisórias. 
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Introduction 
 
In research on colonial slavery, we find the role played by law and courts very 
much debated. Whereas Tannenbaum (1946) and legal historians like Watson (1989) 
attribute an important influence to legal tradition, especially to Roman law in the case 
of Latin America2, experts of modern and Colonial history show some reluctance to 
admit or do even frankly negate any influence of the law on the slave societies of the 
New World3. Following this, their formation would have been dictated by economic 
imperatives only4, making them unique in world history of slavery5. We may structure 
these contrasting views by some possible master narratives. The first one would state 
that Iberian slave law, characterized as milder and more humane than the slave law of 
the Common Law tradition of Great Britain by authors like Tannenbaum6, was not 
applied in the colonies, because of the disdain of New World’s master class, unwilling 
to accept any restraints of exploitation. Therefore, state institutions like courts would 
have had no function in the regulation of the master-slave-relationship (“protective 
law” – “oppressive masters”). A second way to tell the story does not at all consider 
benign the peninsula’s slave law as practiced at the end of the Middle Ages, but rather 
sees it as a slave law already fitting very well the interests of a master class, the reason 
why the colonizers used it to form their new slave societies. This master narrative fits 
the image of the role of courts in the shaping of (colonial) slave societies as one of 
mainly imposing cruel punishments for often minor offences of slaves and freedmen, 
thus forming just another instrument of repression in the hands of the master class. 
This was a seamless continuation of the repressive and often inhuman practices on 
plantations. This narrative continues by argues that improvements achieved by slaves 
led to a derogation of archaic European slave law, forming a new, colonial and 
customary slave law (“oppressive law” and “oppressive masters” – “resistant slaves”). 
                                                 
2
 Among comparative studies inspired by Tannenbaum are Elkins (1959), Klein (1967), Degler (1971); 
Conrad (1994), Scott (2005), Cooper et al. (2000), Landers (1999), Ingersoll (1999), Din (1999), as well 
as the literature quoted in Bergard (2007). 
3
 Cf. Osterhammel (2009), who applies the metaphor of Roman law as an empty seashell, which could 
not give any form to modern slavery.  
4
 Figueira/Mendes (1977, esp. p. 33). 
5
 Cf. Blackburn (1996, 3): “radically new in character compared with prior forms of slavery”; 
Osterhammel (2009, 28), Elsenhals (2007). 
6
 Today, this view is quite rightly relativated. 
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In opposition to both of these possible narratives, a third one is possible - statig, that 
Portuguese slave law was applied in Brazil without extensive changes in favor or of the 
masters or of the slaves (“conservative slave law”). In accordance to a fourth master 
narrative, European slave law did not reach the colonies at all (“legal vacuum”). The 
legally nearly unrestricted power of the master class is interpreted as only limited by 
the slaves’ successful negotiations and resistance. In a frequently quoted article, Cunha 
(1985) develops the thesis of the absence of state institutions and of metropolitan 
slave law in master-slave relationships, stressing the existence of customary law 
instead, developed in direct negotiations between the two parties or groups. As to the 
Brazilian context, we can link these interpretations to certain phases of historiography. 
Slaves were interpreted as relatively passive victims of plantation capitalism, without 
any rights, by authors who number among the Escola Sociológica Paulista7 (which fits 
best to the first master narrative). A younger generation of scholars, emerging since 
the 1980s, stresses the quality of slaves as historical subjects instead. In this context, 
the idea of slaves conquering rights becomes crucial8 (this fits with the second or 
fourth master narrative). The still inspiring leading questions these debates provoke 
are: did a Brazilian slave law existe? And to what extent did it differ from Portuguese 
slave law?  
The younger historiography began to pay attention to the civil branch of 
colonial courts and its mechanisms to define status. A person kept as a slave might 
have learned about a manumission given to him and sought a court to enforce it, or 
claimed a right to be freed following from a corresponding promise or last will. Or 
maybe a person living for years as a freedperson found herself discovered as a fugitive 
slave, and was suddenly called back into slavery, or liberty was revoked because of 
“ingratitude” or because of not paying the contracted installments of the price for 
freedom. Investigating such cases, commonly referred to as freedom suits (but better, 
because it is more neutral, and reflects more precisely both possible directions: status 
suits), began with studies like the pioneering one of Grinberg (1994). Brazilian 
historians interpreted freedom suits as a relatively late development and mostly 
related them closely to the abolitionist movement of the nineteenth century 
                                                 
7
 Gonçalves (2006, p. 25), cites as examples Bastide/Fernandes (1959), Costa (1988), Cardoso (1962).  
8
 See, for example, the interpretation of manumissions as strategies of resistance by Paiva (1995).  
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(Gonçalves, 2006, p. 31)9, even describing it as an instrument in the hands of 
abolitionists. Not surprisingly, the origins of the Brazilian freedom trial are sometimes 
dated not before the second half of the eighteenth century (Grinberg, 1994, p. 24-
25)10. One of the first authors paying attention to the eighteenth century is Diório 
(2007). More recent studies reveal the existence of such cases already during the 
colonial era and broaden the scope of investigation to the Portuguese Atlantic, like the 
exemplary study of Pinheiro (2013). 
Although most of the freedom trials levied at the Portuguese National Archive 
(Torre de Tombo, ANTT) only date back to the era of Pombal and represent the 
dexterous implementation of the legislation against the importation of slaves and 
finally against slavery as such by the slaves and their supporters (Pinheiro, 2013, p. 17-
18), we have to go further and consider that already Portugal’s medieval and early 
modern courts knew such claims of the “Moorish” unfree emanating from the 
“Reconquista”. Unfortunately sources prior to the eighteenth century are extremely 
scarce, but there exist some traces11. In Évora, in the year 1582, Grácia “mourisca” 
recorded in the books of the notary public a sentence stating her freedom, obtained 
against a local capitular, her arrogated owner12. But blacks do appear as parties quite 
early. In the year 1569, at Évora as well, Brás Fernandes recorded a power of attorney 
to defend his freedom judicially against Beatriz Figueira, his ostensible mistress, basing 
his argumentation on a manumission given by an ex-owner13. Freedom suits do also 
already appear in collections of decisions, for example the case of Pero Simões, 
resident in Vila Verde, against Beatriz Ribeira, in the year 1582, in the collection 
organized by Belchior Febo (1625, Arest. 35). An emblematic trajectory of a slave in the 
Portuguese empire of the late seventeenth century is the one of Adu. Hailing from the 
kingdom of Meknes, he became the slave of Gonçalo da Costa de Alcáçova Carneiro de 
Meneses, governor of Angola during the years 1691 to 1694. Returning to Lisbon after 
                                                 
9
 For manumissions see for example Bertin (2004), Eisenberg (1987), Nishido (1993), Gonçalves (2000). 
For freedom trials see Chalhoub (1990), Azevedo (2003); Gurgel (2004). 
10
 See also Silva (2007, p. 141). 
11
 To compensate a little bit this lack of sources I would like to quote works on Valencia in the 15th and 
Granada in the 16
th
 centuries. Blumenthal (2009, p. 210-217) detected dozens of files of “demandes de 
libertad” between 1425 and 1520. Martín Casares (1995, p. 209) speaks of “pleitos por [...] libertad”.   
12
 Fonseca (2002,182 ff.), quoting ADE, FN, Évora, Liv. 260, f. 77 v, 23.1.1587. 
13
 The record mentions a „causa e demanda que ele quer(ia) mover contra Beatriz Figueira, sua senhora 
que foi, sobre sua alforria, porquanto o quer(ia) fazer cativo deixando-o seu senhor forro“ (ADE, FN, 
Évora, Livro 199, f. 59, in Fonseca (2002). 
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the termination of his mandate, the governor promised to free Adu formally 
immediately after arrival at the capital. Alas! Adu’s owner died during the passage. 
Reaching Lisbon the freed slave did not hesitate to seek out the court to secure his 
prospected freedom. The court thought it sufficient, that some witnesses had heard 
the promise given on the ship, and declared Adu free14. This simple example should be 
a sufficient introduction to the subject of the freedom (or better: status) trial.  
Since Pinheiro (2013), the argument for the irrelevance of the courts for 
colonial slavery lost ground15. Even if she does not claim to have used a “formal 
comparative method” (Pinheiro, 2013, p. 18), the sources used by Pinheiro at least 
implicitly also show that the legal bases and their application did not differ essentially 
between Portugal and Brazil. But the legal comparison may be further developed. The 
present article concentrates only on one small but crucial detail: preliminary 
injunctions about the factual situation of the person whose status was controversial 
during the proceedings, since the clash appearing in these suits, between the defense 
of property rights on the one side, and the right to freedom on the opposite one, was 
not only a question of substantive law, but expressed itself quite often fiercely during 
the proceedings16. Whereas the party whose status was questioned sought to 
experience the trial like a free person, the second party wanted to see that first one 
treated like chattel until the final sentence, as certain extrajudicial17 and procedural 
manoeuvres reveal. This battle over the interim situation in many cases consumed the 
energies of parties and their lawyers for months. The present article investigates the 
instruments the jurisprudence developed to balance the opponents interests and 
while favoring one not completely putting into risk the other. Whereas enjoying 
unrestrained freedom during the trial the “slave” could use it for flight, being kept as a 
                                                 
14
 Arquivo Nacional Torre de Tombo (ANTT), Feitos Findos (FF), Fundo Geral, Letra A, maço 1200, caixa 
2403, processo 14.  
15
 Her explicit statement on p. 95 deserves full approval (“a Justiça foi sim um recurso aplicado em 
confrontos dessa natureza e [...] seu acionamento coloca em dúvida a dispensa da arena jurídica na 
resolução de tais conflitos e a aceitação do pleno exercício da vontade senhorial e patronal”); also her 
conclusions, p. 95, that especially the masters did use the courts as means to protect their peculiar 
property, the slaves.  
16
 These two aspects could have been seperated more sharply by Pinheiro.  
17
 A very blatant case of unlawful interference is reported by Blumenthal (2009, p. 213): Pere, owner of 
Nicholau, a slave, but factually living in freedom, to work and earn money to buy his freedom, once 
tried to drag Nicholau, “literally, back into his service.” Pere “had grabbed him by the hair, tearing out 
a large clump of it”, but Nicholau could run away and find “shelter in a friend’s house”.  
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“thing” in the hands of his “owner”, the latter could render impossible any procedural 
action of the former. As the measures to be taken were provisional only, we may not 
presume that the problem was closely regulated and without doubt the judges 
enjoyed a wide margin of discretion, but we would be misguided, if we did not seek for 
legal bases at all. So what was the legal framework for such interim measures?  
Some concluding remarks of Pinheiro form our point of departure. She claims 
that there were no specific determinations about the freedom trials in the Ordinances 
(Ordenações) or in other Portuguese laws. Most important would have been 
customary law (“usos”) and the “stilus” (“estilo”) of the courts (Pinheiro, 2013, p. 281). 
This observation is incomplete to a certain extent. It is true, that the civil proceedings 
law of modern Portugal (including the special rules for freedom trials) was only 
fragmentarily codified in the Ordinances, so that the courts had to use the subsidiary 
sources mentioned in the famous passage of book II, chapter 9 of the Afonsine 
Ordinances18. Lawyers, however, had more liberty to cite the Ordinances, Roman Law 
and Canon Law directly, but also national and international legal doctrine, as well as 
codifications of other kingdoms, like the Siete Partidas of Spain. It is remiss not to 
mention these numerous legal references, or formants (Sacco, 1991)19, because in fact 
as a whole they form the early modern law of Portugal and Brazil20 as a part of the 
much larger legal family of the early modern Civil Law, the “ius commune”21. Among 
the subsidiary sources mentioned by the Ordinances, special attention has to be paid 
to Roman Law, because the modern freedom trial quite obviously was anything but 
new. As one of the most important slave societies in the history of mankind, the 
Romans experienced status lawsuit22 in the directions [rei vindicatio] in servitutem or 
                                                 
18
 In the following ranking order: the stilus, the customary law, the Roman Law (“Leis Imperiais”), but the 
Canon Law (“Santos Cânones”), if the application of Roman Law would lead to sin. Accursius was 
declared the authoritative glossator, and if no solution could be found in his works, Bartolus should be 
consulted. As is well known, the Manueline Ordinances meant a certain opening, because the 
communis opinio now could be prevail over Accursius or Bartolus. 
19
 Speaking of formants, a very short but striking extract of a freedom trial of 15
th
 century Valencia 
(Blumenthal, 2009, p. 213) shall be quoted: The freedom of the slave in that special case could be 
legally based on “disposiciones de drets canonich e civil e de furs del present regne”.  
20
 Pinheiro (2013, p. 137-150) describes the proceedings quite well, but there are only scarce quotations 
of contemporary doctrine, legal sources etc. to back this description.  
21
 In this short article I may not enter into the debate about the concept „ius commune“. 
22
 In the Digest, the entire title 12 of book 40 is dedicated to them, and in the Justinian Code the entire 
title 16 of book 7 (cf. also 4.9 of the Theodosian Code). 
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[rei vindicatio] in libertatem23. There are sufficient hints in the sources that a certain 
range of interim measures about this conflict during the trial were also developed as 
early as the Roman republic, or maybe even when Rome was still a kingdom. Studies 
on the modern status suit mostly neglect this inheritance24. However, a profound 
comparison of the legal semantics of ancient and modern slavery is a crucial argument 
to question the thesis of the uniqueness of modern slavery and to stress a certain 
cultural unity between ancient and modern slavery25. One leading question of this 
article therefore is to detect to what extent the legal writings of modern lawyers show 
their knowledge of the existence of the freedom suit in ancient Rome and how they 
used it to base their solutions. Here, I do not enter into the “big” debates about 
continuity or rupture between the ancient and the modern world (Schiavone, 2002)26 
and about the proper way (referring to hermeneutical theory) to interpret the use of 
Roman law in the early modern world (reception, transfer27, (legal) transplant or 
cultural translation?)28, but I hope my initial comparative remarks will foster further, 
necessary dialogue with romanists and ancient historians.  
 
                                                 
23
 Correctly streching the importance to differ between the two directions, for the modern freedom 
trial, Pinheiro (2013, 91). 
24
 Even though the written pleadings in the records of Mariana and Lisbon are full of them, Pinheiro for 
example does not quote one single prescription of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, if we are not mistaken. 
25
 See the committed call for a more profound comparison of ancient and modern slavery by Dal 
Lago/Katsari (2008).  
26
 But I do take an unequivocal stand on the side of those who stress continuities rather than ruptures, 
namely because of the medieval development of slave law and slavery, as investigated by Nehlsen 
(1972), who unfortunately concentrates on delicts commited by slaves and therefore does not touch 
our subject, the status suits, Verlinden (1955) and many others, and especially the phenomenon we 
may call “Mediterranean Colonialism” (Feldbauer et al., 2005). I do reject, on the contrary, a rupture in 
the 15
th
 century (between medieval and modern slavery). A little bit clumsy on this matter is 
Delacampagne (2002). He divides the book in three big parts, and lets the first part end with medieval 
century. This insinuates an important rupture between medieval Mediterranean and modern Atlantic 
slavery. Nevertheless, at the very first pages of the second part, Delacampagne stresses the continuity. 
27
 Gaudemet (1976) prefers that concept to reception.  
28
 On these debates see Duve (2012). However, Genzmer’s critique (quoted by Duve, 2012, p. 49) is not 
convincing. Genzmer (1953) still uses “reception” without any critical remarks, Genzmer (1958) 
already shows a certain distance, but only by using quotation marks. Genzmer (1961) wants to reject 
the concept becausee of its vastness and ambiguity. We may ask, if transplant or translation are less 
ambiguous and used in a more uniform way by authors working in the field…  The concepts proposed 
by Genzmer (1961, p. 144) to replace “reception” (“infiltration” or “penetration”) are worse, because 
their tendency to ignore the agency of the historical subjects is even stronger. Wieacker (1967, p. 132) 
defends the concept of reception partially against Genzmer, and also Sellert (1998) and Willoweit 
(2002) continue to use it. More recently, Giaro (2007) in a very nuanced article shows the deficits of 
the concept of transfer and therefore does not to abandon the concept of reception aas well. Maybe 
we have to use all the four of the concepts cumulatively, to explain the long and complex transfer of 
Roman law to the colonies and Native populations.  
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Interim injunctions in status trails – a brief outline of the development in Ancient 
Rome 
 
The first difficulty, when we ask, if the ancient Roman status trial could have 
served as a model for the modern one, is that the Roman status trial did not exist. 
Rather, as is the case with civil procedure law as a whole, its historical development 
passed through several changes during the more than 1,200 years of Roman history29. 
In the era of the Republic, the person claimed as slave or claiming to be free, in terms 
of the capacity to sue and to be sued, was treated more like a piece of property, a 
thing (res), to be vindicated30, and consequently not able to act as a litigant. This role 
had to be played by the adsertor libertatis who acted as if he would “revindicate” the 
“slave”31. In such a rei vindicatio, already in the age of the legis actio sacramento in 
rem32 we have to separate carefully two legal concepts – that of ownership and that of 
(quasi-33)possession – the first one describing the legal situation, the second one the 
factual situation34. In a preliminary decision, called vindicias dicere, the Roman 
magistrate decided who could enjoy “possession” of the item in dispute during the 
proceedings (Kaser/Hackl, 1996, p. 99)35. The sources tell us about a particularity of the 
freedom trial: the judge had to decide this preliminary situation always secundum 
libertatem, in favor of the party claiming liberty36. What this meant in practice, is not 
                                                 
29
 A short introduction gives Metzger (2013); see also Peixoto (2013, p. 14-23).  
30
 Franciosi (1961, p. 231): “oggetto di processo”. The ritual of the rei vindicatio at that age is described 
in the Institutes of Gaius (4, 16). Both parties had to touch the claimed object with a bar 
(vindicta/festuca) and to speak a certain formula. After that, the magistrate asked both parties to 
leave the object (“mittite ambo rem (hominem)”).  
31
 The formula of a „normal“ rei vindicatio was modificated: The adsertor had to pronounce “liberum 
esse”, and the “owner” could pronounce, without modification, “meum esse” (Indra, 2011, p. 38). 
32
 Existent at least since the early Republic (about BC 500), but very probably already during the age of 
the kings (Kaser/Hackl, 1996, 92). On the freedom trial in the form of a legis actio see Sciortino (2010, 
ch. II).  
33
 It was the famous medieval jurist Baldus de Ubaldis, in his commentary on the Justinian Code (3.4.3), 
who denoted freedom and slavery as quasi-possession.   
34
 For the modern Portuguese and Brazilian freedom trials this is very well demonstrated by Pinheiro 
(2013), see the title of the first chapter of her thesis: “A posse e o usufruto da liberdade”). However, 
maybe the term “social condition” (“condição social”) should have been avoided to denominate this 
factual situation, because for a lot of sociologists, legal status is one factor for the social condition (the 
social condition of a slave who lives on his/her own is not the same as of a free person who lives on 
her own).   
35
 The Roman jurist Gaius tells us in the Institutes (4.16), that this means, that the judge „ interim 
aliquem possessorem constituebat“.  
36
 We know this because of Livius, Ab urbe condita, III, 47, 56, 58, narrating the famous freedom trial of 
Virginia (Nicolau, 1933, p. 179-198; Franciosi, 1961, chapter 6, pp. 197 ff.); see also D. 1.2.2.24. 
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quite clear. Kaser/Hackl (1996, p. 101 and 103), Kaser/Knütel/Lohsse (2017, 104) and 
Indra (2011, p. 38 and 88) hold that the person the trial was about could really live as 
free37, others assert that the adsertor could keep the “slave” safe38, deciding, how 
much liberty of movement he would dare to concede her/him39. In any case of a flight 
of his protégé, the adsertor or some bailsmen40 were held responsible and had to pay 
the value to the owner, if the latter won the case41. The actio in rem per sponsionem, 
which substituted (or modified) the legis actio sacramento in rem (Kaser/Hackl, 1996, 
p. 105), despite the abolition of the vindicias dicere maybe did not mean any radical 
alteration as to the question of the interim situation of the “slave”42. The process of 
agere per formulas43 probably began during the Mid-Republic, and during the Late 
Republic rolled back the two older forms of civil procedure. The parties became more 
clearly defined as plaintiff and defendant44. The cautiones continued being 
satisdationes by suitable bailsmen (sponsores idonei)45. During classical times46, the 
situation seems to have been altered in a way even more favorable to the pretendent 
                                                 
37
 See also D. 40.12.24.pr. and D. 40.12.25.2.  
38
 Nicolau (1933, p. 128) speaks of a “véritable droit de garde sur la personne du prétendu esclave et sur 
ses biens“, and (p. 140) of a “certain pouvoir de l’adsertor sur le prétendu esclave”, called custodia. 
The interim freedom of a slave was “une liberté […] surveillé”. Franciosi (1961, p. 232) agrees: “Le 
vindiciae secundum libertatem attribuiscono la custodia dell’individuo a colui che ne asserisce la 
libertà”; see also Franciosi (1961, p.258): The judge attributed possession to the adsertor (attribuzione 
del possesso all’ adsertor libertatis“).  
39
 Sciortino remains vague to the question to what extent the adsertor libertatis could restrain the 
liberty of the “slave” (Sciortino, 2010, p. 156).  
40
 Praedes litis et vindiciarum, see Degeneffe (2006).   
41
 Especially in a procedure extra ordinem, the adsertor had to deposit a bail, securing the claimed 
owner against a loss of his potential slave (Nicolau, 1933, p. 116).   
42
 At least the cautio pro praede was a satisdatio, i. e. a stipulatio substantiated by a bailsman (sponsor), 
Gaius, Inst. 4, 89 and 94, Kaser/Hackl (1996, p. 106, note 108). It is controversial, if the status trial was 
possible at all in this form in both directions (Scortino, p. 2010, ch. III).  
43
 See Sciortino (2010, ch. III), who states that the freedom trial was dealt with in this form since the 
early Principate. The details about the possible form of the freedom trial in that age are highly 
controversial. Nicolau (1933, p. 145-147) holds the view that in freedom trials never was proceeded 
per sponsionem. Sciortino’s main thesis is that neither the agere per formulam, nor the agere per 
sponsionem was possible for a trial with the direction “in libertatem”. In that case, a praeiudicium an 
liber sit would have been developed early. But this controversy is not relevant for the main question of 
the present article, the interim measures. Unfortunately, Sciortino (2010) hardly deals with them.  
44
 D. 40.12.7.5. This made an ordinatio iudicii or litis ordinatio necessary in cases where it was dubious, if 
the person whose status was controversial in fact lived as free or as unfree at the beginning of the 
trial.  
45
 Kaser/Hackl (1996, p. 279). Gaius, Inst. 4.91, may be interpreted in the way that the stipulatio pro 
praede and the cautio iudicatum solvi do not differ essentially. During classical times, the adsertor had 
to provide bail directly, not by a bailsman (Indra, 2011, p. 168 and 230-231). Also concerning the agere 
per formulas it is controversial, if it is was possible in both directions (Sciortino, 2010, ch. III).  
46
 That is more or less between AD 30 and AD 235.  
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of freedom, who was maybe put into interim liberty directly, without custody by his 
adsertor (Franciosi, 1961, p. 231-232), but the “owner” did in no way possess the 
“slave” for the duration of the proceedings47. During the postclassical Empire we 
observe more transformations. By the reform of the year 342 A. D. (abolition of the 
agere per formulas) the cognitio extra ordinem (which is structurally already much 
closer to the civil proceedings of our days) became the standard form of civil 
proceedings in the Roman empire. The tendency went to conserve the factual 
situation, such as it existed at the beginning of the proceedings, during the same. If a 
person claimed in libertatem, she was conserved as a slave until the final sentence48, if 
someone claimed a person in servitutem, the latter one might continue to live as free 
until the final sentence, but had to provide bail (fideiussor). If the “slave” was not able 
to provide bail, it was possible to use the cautio iuratoria (swear an oath), but if the 
“slave” abused the situation to depart and did not appear before court for one year 
after being summoned, the absentee was automatically declared the slave of the 
claimant49. The last important reform happened under the reign of Justinian – the 
adsertor was abolished, and the person whose status the trial was about gained the 
capacity to sue and to be sued (for the freedom trial as such). This very brief overview 
reveals no linear development. The material of several chronological layers, in the 
form it survived in the Corpus Iuris Civilis, was full of lacunae, interpolations and 
contradictions. But we may identify some crucial elements, like the decision of the 
judge as to the roles of the parties and the respective factual situation of the “slave”, 
the bail someone had to put to enable her/him to stay in factual freedom during the 
proceedings, or the possibility of custody in the case of not getting a proper (idoneus) 
bailsman.  
 
The development in modern “ius commune”, especially in Portugal 
 
                                                 
47
 Dig. 40.12.25.2 [Gaius]: „Tantum de possessione videbimus, cum ipsum post litem ordinatam desinat 
dominus possidere [...].” 
48
 In this sense we may interpret Dig. 41.2.3.10 [Paulus, Libro 54 ad edictum]: „si ex possessione 
servitutis in libertatem reclamaverit et liberale iudicium imploraverit, nihilo minus in possessione mea 
est […]”. May it be, as Nicolau (1933, 251) suspects, interpolated or not (Paulus worked after AD 200).  
49
 See Justinian Code (Cod.) 7.17.1.2 (de adsertione tollenda). It seems, that in the era of Justinian there 
did exist a bail to warrant the object of the litigation only in excepctional cases (Kaser/Hackl, 1996, 
576). The fideiussor of Cod. 7.17.1.2 would have the function of a mere cautio iudicio sisti.  
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The medieval glossators, postglossators (commentators), the following 
generations of the mos italicus and mos gallicus and, last but not least, the canonists 
worked on this Roman heritage and shaped what is often called the Roman-canon 
procedural law (Trusen, 1962; Nehlsen-von Stryk, 1991; Litewski, 1999; Nörr, 2012), 
which constituted the central legal basis of the freedom suit during the Middle Ages 
(for lack of sources unfortunately nearly unknown, at least concerning Portugal) and 
the Early Modern Age. In proceedings about chattels or real estate, the magistrate 
could make a preliminary decision of the possessory situation during the proceedings50 
called summariissimum or mandantum de manutenendo51 from the fifteenth century 
onwards (Coing, 1985, p. 286-287). It is controversial among modern authors, as to 
mandatum de manutenendo was a late medieval creation52 or if it was the mere 
application of the Roman prescriptions (Lobão, 1867, ch. X, § 166). However one of the 
references used to underpin this institute was D. 40.12.7.5 (Postio, 1646, Observation 
IV, n. 1) – a regulation on the preparation of a status trial, more exactly on the 
definition of the role of the claimant and the defendant taken from the comment of 
Ulpian (who lived around the year 200 A.D.) on the edictum perpetuum (of the year 
130 AD). The important editor of a Portuguese collection of decisions, Macedo (1699, 
decis. 52), who, like Postio, quotes D. 40.12.7.5 explicitly, explains that it would be the 
same procedure called vindiciarum in the antiquity. Despite its brevity, this hint is 
fascinating because it shows that Macedo cares about the historical development of 
the institute, and that in his opinion the proceedings in their passage from the 
Republican age of the legis actiones to the cognitio of the Late Empire did not suffer 
major changes as to this detail. It is no surprise that the summariissimum was very 
frequently used in the modern freedom trial53, especially by persons who feared to be 
                                                 
50
 See Postio (1646) and Menochio (1687). Unfortunately neither Litewski (1999), nor Nörr (2012) 
provide indications about functionally comparable measures in the older Roman-canon proceedings.  
51
 Translating manutenção we have to be very careful. “Maintenance”, which is really the same word, 
juridically can be absolutely misleading! The civil law practice of maintaining someone in the 
possession of something, the institute of the mandatum de manutenendo of continental ius commune, 
has nothing in common with the common law’s “writ of maintenance”.  
52
 Against the idea that the summariisimmum could be detected in Roman law already: Sarmiento (1616, 
128), Böhmer (1762, p. 637). 
53
 One example is the case of Manuel Rodrigues of the year 1806, quoted by Pinheiro (2013, p. 62). In 
her chapter on petitions to be maintained in liberty, Pinheiro (p. 151-165) does not reveal its origin, 
legal basis, or the doctrine quoted by the jurists in their written pleadings; a clear distinction between 
summariissimum and possessorium ordinarium is missing. Even the contemporary jurists did not 
always distinguish neatly, according to Lobão, (1867, p. 120), between the isolated summarissimum 
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caught by arrogated owners.  If such a person was already caught, and the owner at 
the same time had started an action against her liberty, the proceedings could be 
interrupted by an exceptio spolii54 (in Portuguese: esbulho), a device developed by 
canonist procedural law during the Middle Ages55, until the person was set free again. 
In such a situation, the difficulty for the judge often was to decide if the person 
deprived of her factual liberty was to be considered simply a fugitive, without any right 
to enjoy freedom, or if the situation of her “possession of liberty” was so firm, that it 
was worth being protected.  
In the worst case, during the modern age the factual slave claiming his 
freedom had to continue under the authority of his master (Barbosa, 1712, headword 
Servus), a solution corresponding to the probable situation of the Late Roman 
Empire56. According to the sixteenth century Spanish jurist Otálora (1570, p. 151-152), 
the decision to put the “slave” in interim liberty (Otálora, 1570, p. 152, quotes 
C.7.16.14 and D. 40.12.24 for that solution), or to let him full under the authority of 
the presumed owner, depended on the quality of the title (“titulu[s] vel instrumentum 
servitutis”)  the owner was able to present. In some cases, the “slaves” who had 
remain under the authority of their masters could at least request the “owner” to 
guarantee, the individual would not be maltreated (cautio de non offendendo57) or 
removed to a distant place (Otálora, 1570, p. 15258; see cases below). Practice, “stilus”, 
had developed a further mitigation of the slaves’ situation – while litigating, the slave 
had to serve during three days of the week only, having three days off to be able to 
attend to his claim59. We see the property claim and the freedom claim both halfway 
                                                                                                                                               
and the one combined with the main action. A petition to be maintained in liberty could be filed in 
three procedural situations: As the main request of an ordinary possessory action, as the main request 
of an isolated summary action, or as a request for an interime measure.   
54
 During my current research I also have found freedom trials in the form of an actio spolii, but as this 
article is about interim measures only, I do not consider them here. 
55
 The canonists used the model of the interdict unde vi, cf. Goecke (1858) and Ruffini (1889).  
56
 Cf. at footnote 48, above. In ANTT FF FG maço R 375, Rita Thereza (mulher preta) ./. Jozé Ferreira 
Mendes (von 1767), fol. 59 the lawyer justifies this with the circumstance, that the owner in return 
had to maintain the “slave”. As legal authority he quotes Fragoso (1737, p. 622), where Fragoso 
allegates D. 41.1.19. 
57
 The cautio de non offendendo was frequently used in marital disputes. A short and not too demanding 
introduction offers the Summa of Savelli (1748, p. 239-242).  
58
 The Oydores [judges] order, “que el señor da fianças de dexar seguir al sieruo su causa, y no le 
trasportar, ni maltratar &c.” 
59
 Febo (1625, arest. 35): “Somente he obrigado seu senhor a darlhe tempo para yr a requerer sua 
justiça âs audiencias, & casa dos officiaes de justiça, & por estyllo se lhe dão tres dias na semana 
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satisfied60. However, sometimes, this did not go far enough as to the “slaves”. They 
often stated their fear of being hidden in private dungeons, transported to distant 
places or abused, and requested to be taken away from the house of their owners with 
the aim of being put into safe custody at a third person’s place61. Unfortunately, the 
requests generally do not quote legal references explicitly62. A general argument to 
justify the measure was the “favor libertatis”. Some lawyers saw this solution also as a 
product of stilus63, some quote Ord. Fil. 3.78.564. Such a custodianship was not 
uncommon during litigations concerning moveable objects (Lobão, 1867, ch. XII), 
especially as a variation of the summariissimum (Postio, 1646, obs. LXXV), as well as in 
the case of marital conflicts65. But, as we see by the fact that it was very often the 
slave to request it, the custody cannot be seen as a means to protect the property 
rights of the “owner” only, but again, like the three days off, as a reconciliation of the 
                                                                                                                                               
[...].”Arouca (1742, adnotat. ad. lib. 1 tt.
o
 6 et his qui sunt sui L. § 1 n.
o
 25): “Et praxis observat dies a 
domino convento tres in hebdomada servo largiendi ut liti pro sua libertate intentata possit assistire”. 
Sometimes, the jugdes already defined exactly, which of the days should be conceded to the slave. See 
the case ANTT FF FG maço J 725, cx. 1644 (Joanna Maria de Santa Anna ./. Agostinho da Silva 
Hofmann, von 1802). It seems that there is no precedent in Roman law, and also the modern doctrine 
outside of Portugal seems to ignore this solution.  
60
 To my great pleasure I see now, during a rereading of Blumenthal (2009, p. 215), that this was very 
similar in Valencia. In one case (see below) though, the days off were only two.  
61
 For the fifteenth century Valencia Blumenthal (2009, p. 215) reports that when „filing a demand for 
liberty, slaves turned themselves over into the protective custody of the governor. They would then be 
placed either in the city’s prison or in a designated safe house. Nevertheless, in many instances, at a 
master’s or mistress’ urging, the court would release the slave back into their owner’s custody. The 
court would only do so, however, upon receipt of a sworn promise from the master (or mistress) that 
they would neither physically harm the slave nor take him or her outside the city limits. In this way, 
the court worked to ensure the slaves could not be intimidated or bullied into withdrawing their 
claims.” In one important example (p. 213, note 72), the mistress had to swear “de no maltractar 
aquella axi com si no fos sclava e aço sub pena de docents florins [...]” and to permit “que dos dies de 
la setmana ço es lo dimarts e lo divendres en lo apres dinar una hora en cascu dels dits dies que 
aquella puxa venir parlar e comunicar ab lo procurador e advocat per la present causa.” The struggles 
and their solutions are amazingly similar to our own findings in Portugal and Brazil! But see also the 
case of Russian slave Anna (Blumenthal 2009, p. 215-216), whose owner did violate such an oath, 
whipping her cruelly and transporting her out of the city.  
62
 Maybe this is the case in Blumenthal’s (2009) sources as well, because Blumenthal does not quote a 
single legal allegation in the passages on the interim solutions. 
63
 ANTT FF FG maço J 3022, Irmandade de Nossa Senhora do Rosario (Graça) ./. João Antonio Pereira (of 
the year 1810), fol. 1: „depozito do Estillo”; ANTT FF FG letra J, maço J 2734, Irmandade de Nossa 
Senhora do Rosario (Graça) por cabeça de Thomazia Maria ./. Luis Romão Lopes, fol. 4 (“he do 
estillo”). ANTT FF FG maço J 3015, Irmandade de Jesus Maria José (Carmo) ./. Lourenço da Costa 
Piedade (von 1830): „Antes de se propôr a competente acção de liberdade de qualq[ue]r preta ou 
parda conservada em escravidão neste Reino contra o preceito da ley, he practica proceder-se no 
depozito [...])”.  
64
 Historical Archive “Casa Setecentista”, Mariana, Minas Gerais [AHCSM], Autos Cíveis [AC] 2, 274, 6728, 
fol. 3 shall be quoted here, although it is colonial and not from the metropole. 
65
 Postio (1646, Obs. XLIII, § 4) speaks of a “depositum Mulieris”. 
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property interests with the interests of the “slave”. The depositing had to be in an 
“honest and secure house”. It was no exception, that one party doubted the qualities 
of a depositary proposed by the adversary. A slave’s request to be kept safe was not 
very different of that of an abused woman, who could ask to be taken away from her 
husband during the proceedings of a divorce (Postio, 1646, obs. XLIII). Quite often, in 
practice, safe custody meant a high degree of preliminary freedom, because 
depositaries who did not fear flight, let the slaves move quite unrestrained66, instead 
of keeping them “under lock and key”. The depositary in such a case turned himself 
much more into a bailsman, a function which required that he was propertied, 
especially with real estate. In some cases, a person claimed as slave could stay in 
freedom during the proceedings only when providing bail67. This can be interpreted as 
an application of Ord. Fil. 3.31.pr and 2, a prescription that incorporated the idea that 
bail served as cautio iudicium sisti and to warrant the value of the object. In some 
cases, the litigants tried to provide only a cautio iuratoria, as mentioned in the 
Justinian Code 7.17.1.2. There is no clear line of jurisprudence in the question of 
providing bail. 
In Lisbon, where blacks during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
formed about ten percent of the population, members of their well organized lay 
brotherhoods (the best known being the one of Our Lady of the Rosary) processed the 
streets collecting money to help unfree members to buy their freedom, and assisted 
their members in freedom suits, frequently as nominal plaintiffs of representative 
actions, or at the least in paying lawyers’ fees. In 1767, the lawyer of the black slave 
Rita Thereza made a request that she should be deposited based on the fear that her 
assumed owner could block her right to continue the freedom trial against him68. The 
court conceded to the interim measure, but now the owner entered with an appeal, 
alleging that the whole matter was initiated by the depositary whose intention would 
be to fraudulently employ the services of the slave. He only wanted to grant the slave 
the usual three days off. It would be a small triumph for every slave, were it sufficient 
                                                 
66
 To the disappointment of the “owners”, who got to know about their deposited “slaves” strolling 
around.  
67
 See, especially for the status trial, Cod. 7.17.1.2.  
68
 He could do something, “a fim de não poder uzar do Dir[ei]to da Reclamação de liberdade, que contra 
elle tem intentado.” (ANTT FF FG letra R, maço 375). 
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to bring suit against his master, to get rid of the duty to serve him (at least for a while), 
and in consequence it would hardly exist any Master not confronted with freedom 
trials69. The attorney of “slave” Elias Ximines in 1767 went less far. He requested to 
have Elias deposited, or, in case his alleged owner desired to continue to be served by 
Elias, at least a cautio de non offendendo70. Such a cautio was also solicited in the case 
of the Brotherhood of the Rosary (Salvador da Mata) against Dr. Manuel Francisco de 
Carvalho, in behalf of the slave José Narciso da Cunha71. The lawyer quotes Cortiada 
(1665, p. 95 [decision 66, §§ 11-14])72, but also German authors, namely the dissertatio 
“De agris desertis” (Stryk (praes.)/Fuchs (resp.)73, 1698, chapter VII, § 4974) and 
Brunnemann (1683, p. 23 [on D. 1.6.2])75.  
                                                 
69
 “Alias por certo que não seria de pequeno triumpho para os Escravos, se apenas demandassem seus 
S[e]n[ho]res pella liber[da]de, e logo se reputassem livres, e p[ar]a effeito de já mais os servirem, poiz 
estou certo que a praticar-se este absurdo, não haveria S[enho]r algum sem letigio movido pelo seu 
escravo, porque, como não pagão custas sempre ao menos interassavão a izenção do trabalho.”  
70
 “[O] Supp[lica]do caucione de non offendendo, cazo q[ue] queira uzar das obras do servo pendente a 
lide sobre a liberdade“ (ANTT FF FG maço J 3616). 
71
 The trial is of the year 1777, ANTT FF FG maço J 2941. The quotations are at fol. 166. Not only had the 
“owner” to provide bail, but the judge threatened him with a fine of 200,000 Reis and ten years of 
exile in Angola (fol. 257) in case maltreated the litigant. This exile in my opinion is quite clearly inspired 
by D. 1.6.2, a passage of the Digest mentioning the exile of a certain Umbricia for maltreatment of her 
slave: “Divus etiam Hadrianus Umbriciam quandam matronam in quinquennium relegavit, quod ex 
levissimis causis ancillas atrocissime tractasset.” In English (translation: Scott): “The Divine Hadrian 
also, banished for five years a certain matron named Umbricia, because she had treated her female 
slaves with atrocious cruelty for very trivial reasons.” See also the solicitation of an exile for the case of 
the maltreatment of a slave in ANTT FF FG maço J 3775, Irmandade de Nossa Senhora do Rosario 
(Santa Marinha) ./. Capitão Jozé Lopes da Silva (1773).  
72
 Cortiada follows the opinion, that a slave who fled to a church because he feared to be maltreated (or 
had already suffered maltreatment) by the owner (“si servus propter domini saevitiam […] ad 
Ecclesiam confugit”), had to be restituted to the latter (“dominus est restitutendus”), but only “recepto 
ab eo iuramento de illum non offendendo”. Cortiada quotes several references from Roman and canon 
law, and more than a dozen of authors to back up his argument. In § 13 he continues, that in certain 
cases the cautio iuratoria could not be sufficient, but by the owner should be provided a stronger 
cautio (“recepta à domino maiori securitate”). For this opinion Cortiada quotes again several authors, 
like Farinacci, Diana, Barbosa. Cortiada does not say, if this stronger cautio was pignoraticia or 
fideiussoria; maybe both of them were possible. If the owner was not willing to provide some form of 
caution, he could be forced to sell the slave (§ 14); more detailed on this: Korzilius (2011). 
73
 To mention the name of the PhD-supervisor (Stryk) and the PhD-candidate (Fuchs) in the case of early 
modern dissertations or theses corresponds to our knowledge on the specific form of academic 
cooperation between the two of them in the Early Modern Ages (Schubart-Fikentscher, 1970). I am 
grateful to prof. Susanne Lepsius, LMU Munich, for this information. 
74
 “Imo si à saevitia sibi metuat servus, cautio de non offendendo exigi poterit.” This quotation is 
fascinating, because it reveals very well how the topical search for authorities by the jurists of the ius 
commune functioned. In the original context, the preoccupation of this part of the thesis of Fuchs, 
guided by Stryk, was with German serfs deserting from the fields because their fear of maltreatments 
by the vassals who held the land. Obviously, for our Portuguese lawyer the difference of the contexts 
was no problem at all! The same solution as to German serfs could apply to Portuguese slaves!  
75
 The quotation of Brunnemann, though, is less pertinent, because Brunnemann does not mention the 
cautio. 
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A very interesting turn could occur when slaves were imprisoned by their 
owners in a public prison. Such a massive demonstration of power, such an extreme 
deprivation of  the factual, natural freedom of movement of the slave, the symbolic 
degradation to chattel, could suddenly turn against the owner, reduce perceptibly his 
powers, and even help to secure the slave’s way to legal liberty. The means to reach 
this aim was a kind of freezing injunction (embargo), obtained by an attorney of the 
“slave”, prohibiting the jailor (carcereiro) and prison staff to hand over the “slave” to 
his master, if the latter would not present the final sentence of a trial “in servitutem”76.  
At Lisbon, slaves were sometimes imprisoned by their owners at the prison of 
Belém, near the harbor, to prepare to transport them overseas (mostly to Brazil). 
Especially in such cases, the lay brotherhoods hurried to get an injunction77. This 
became more frequent after the year of 1763, when the importation of Brazilian slaves 
to Portugal was prohibited in cases when Brazilian masters who had brought their 
slaves to Lisbon during a journey tried to re-export them78. Often such a plan failed – a 
new legal situation at the metropolis had turned this special kind of imported chattel 
into a free human being. Last-minute legal help reached slave Antonio José Joaquim in 
the year 1784. He was already on board of a ship to be exported, when judicial officers 
reached him with the saving court order to have him deposited in prison79. The most 
favorable solution for the “slave” was to let him attend proceedings remaining 
(factually) free, upon posting a bond. To find a bailsman in such a case could mean the 
end of imprisonment to a slave, and preliminary freedom saw its most perfect 
flowering. Ownership saw itself deprived of many of its aspects as an all-embracing 
right to dominion. In extreme cases, it could be reduced to the economic interest 
incorporated in the slave. The bailment had to cover the “slave’s” estimated market 
                                                 
76
 See, for example, ANTT FF FG maço J 2996, Irmandade de Nossa Senhora de Guadalupe ./. Francisco 
José Pereira (von 1818), fol. 12 v: “[O]s Suplicantes tem proposto em juizo a competente acção de 
liberdade contra o Suplicado, athe a decisão da mesma deve a dita sua Irman existir por Depozito na 
sobredita prizão em que se acha ou em caza decente e honesta, e temendo-se os Suplicantes dos 
subterfugios do Suplicado pertendem que Vossa Senhoria se sirva que seja a mesma embargada na 
prizão em que se acha a fim de ahi ficar em Depozito e da mesma não sahir sem ordem de Vossa 
Senhoria e decizão da dita cauza de liberdade [...]”. 
77
 As in the case of the slave Pedro (ANTT FF FG maço J 821, cx. 1864, Irmandade de Nossa Senhora do 
Rosario (Salvador da Mata) ./. Antonio José Basto (of the year1811)). 
78
 Cf. ANTT FF FG maço J 1464, Irmandade de Nossa Senhora do Rosario dos Homens pretos (Salvador da 
Mata) ./. Manuel Coresma, of the year 1806), fol. 2.  
79
 ANTT FF FG maço J 3181, Irmandade de Jesus Maria José (convento de Jesus) ./. Agostinho Rodriguez 
Alberto. 
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value. 
In some special situations, the positions seem somewhat changed in a 
paradoxical way, like in the question of sustentation. Whereas under normal 
conditions it was clear that ownership included the duty to nourish one’s slave, owners 
sometimes refused this when their “property” turned rebellious and dared to claim 
freedom. Therefore, Rita Thereza had to claim to be maintained in her freedom against 
her owner, whose property suddenly had turned into a useless burden: without being 
able to exploit her labor, he would have to pay her a monthly sum, to be supported by 
the depositary. This sounded absurd to him. If Rita wanted to be sustained, such was 
his conclusion, she had to come back home and to continue her work. The fact that 
this incident went up to the highest court of the kingdom demonstrates, to what 
extent the opposing sides could harden. The Supreme Court decided in favor of Rita, 
but her owner still did not accept the verdict. He wanted the depository feed her, 
being the one who could use her laborforce. However, in accordance with dominant 
opinion, a depository was not allowed to use the deposited thing – and this meant he 
could not make a deposited slave work for him. But an owner did not admit defeat so 
easily. Did property not give him the right to auction the labor of his slave off publicly, 
at least during three days of the week, following the old rule “quidquid acquirit [the 
slave], domino acquirit”? As the court did not approve this proposal, the owner finally 
gave up. Unwilling to pay the sum to support the slave during the trial, he conceded 
liberty. 
Summarizing this glance of aspects of the metropolitan freedom suit, we see 
the Portuguese alms with its procedural peculiarities inherited from Roman law, 
known by the Visigothic laws, and practiced during the late Middle Ages concerning 
enslaved Moors, in such a way as to be extended swiftly to black Africans, when they 
began to arrive in greater numbers at the peninsula during the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries. Slaves could get, and knew how to get access to courts; they were anything 
but passive objects. Their integration into social networks, especially in the form of lay 
brotherhoods, helped them to learn about ways and means to make use of the courts. 
Proceedings were complex and often lasted for months or even years. An important 
aspect is that there seems to have always been attorneys ready to assist “slaves”.  
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The development in colonial courts 
 
Aside from blacks, Native Americans formed one first important group to 
demand liberty. We are much better informed about the respective situation in 
Spanish rather than the Portuguese American dominions. We know that the 
Audiencias, high courts in the capitals of the vice-kingdoms, dealt with thousands of 
freedom trials concerning Native Americans in the middle of the sixteenth century80. It 
is impressive, how a new social clash was expressed by long established legal 
semantics. The conflict between arrogated property rights and desire for freedom took 
the very same form as we saw in metropolitan freedom suits, even in procedural 
details. The Spanish colonizers did not want to cede possession of the litigating Natives 
during proceedings voluntarily, so the judges had to decide about this preliminary 
question, as described by Acevedo. The way the courts had to decide the question 
(favoring the interim liberty of Native Americans) shows how the global debates of 
public international law influenced even circumstantialities of procedural law81. 
Concerning indigenous Brazilians, the records I found, unfortunately are from the 
eighteenth century only, but they show the same questions still relevant. Like the 
Spanish crown, the Portuguese tried to limit indigenous slavery, above all by restricting 
the cases of just war. But taking into account the ideology of civilizing the savage, the 
labor policy and strategies of social discipline pursued by the metropolitan 
government, it was not difficult for the colonial settlers to achieve a kind of legal 
                                                 
80
 Lucena Salmoral (1982, p. 498) reports about 3.000 cases decided by the Audiencia of Mexico alone.  
81
 Acevedo (1599, ad l. 8., tit. 9, lib. 3, p. 346 f.): One of the captive Indios, who existed as a slave, 
claimed to be freed, and he requested to be pronounced as such by the judge. In the meantime, when 
there does not exist any title about his unfree status, has he to be freed of the dominion of his owner, 
and of his servitude? („Indorum qui in captivitate servitutis existebat, dicat & asserat se liberum, & pro 
tali à iudice pronuntiari petat, interim q[uod] non probatur titulus servitutis debeat à domino (sic!,in 
my opion dominio would be correct: of the dominion, of the power, because then the genitive domini, 
of the owner, would fit well) d[omi]ni, & eius servitute liberari?“). Follwing the rules of (later, Justinian) 
Roman law, he continues, it seems, that the “Indio” could not be set free, but would have to stay in 
the power of his alleged owner, because the latter should not be deprived of his possession. („Et 
videbatur dicendum quod non: quia dum in possessione servi adest, & existit, d[omi]n[u]s no[n] debet 
ea possessione privari: & quia secundu[m] tex. in l. circa ff. de probatio. tenetur probare se liberu[m], 
qui in possessione servitutis est.“) But in the case of Native Americans, the right decision, according to 
Acevedo, was the opposite one: The defendant should lose possession, because he bore the bruden of 
proof concerning the unfree status of the plaintiff („spoliatus d[omi]n[u]s illius servi Indi possessione, 
eius etiam lite durante, & Indus in pristino statu libertatis consitutus, usque dum d[omi]n[u]s eius 
titulum servitutis legitim[u]m probaret“). By legal remedy the case came to the Real Audiencia y 
Chancillería de Valladolid („pinciana“), which decided in the way reported by Acevedo. 
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compromise, very favorable to their interests: Natives, which they could make work 
for them, were called “administrados” (“administrated”), and the relationship between 
the European and his “administrados”, in the euphemistic language of the time, 
comprise a kind of guardianship, serving to educate the Natives in Christendom and 
European culture. In fact, the settlers used the new institution as nothing more than a 
fig-leave, must enable their treatment of their gentio like slaves, like chattel. That they 
did so gets evident especially by three practices: Natives appear like chattel in last 
wills, they were given as dowry, and they were sold (Monteiro, 1994, p. 147) – 
transactions absolutely impossible with respect to free persons82.  
However, was access to courts not extremely difficult for the Native 
Americans? Some of the first aspects that may come to our mind are language 
barriers. At a first level, we come across the highly specialized language of the legal 
professionals, the language of the books, still mostly in Latin. Local lawyers must have 
had access at least to some of them, mostly compilations of the essentials of ius 
commune, so called summulae. However, to whom were the Latin quotations in their 
written pleadings directed? Besides the members of the high courts, even in Portugal, 
only some larger towns had professionals as judges, the so-called juizes de fora. In 
smaller towns, the ordinary judge was taken from the senate of the municipal 
chamber, regularly its president, so he was a layman, and very often not able to 
understand the juridical Latin of his time, needing translations and explanations, 
provided by an assessor. In Brazil, the lack of professional judges was even greater. In 
addition to this first barrier, between professionals and nonprofessionals, or Latin and 
Portuguese, there is the barrier between Portuguese and Native language(s). The latter 
does not appear in the records. Nevertheless, that should not mislead us. The oral 
reality of colonial Brazil was completely different than the one of official written texts. 
The spoken language was the língua geral, in southeastern Brazil called paulista or 
austral, a Tupi-Guarani language (Rodrigues, 2002). Therefore, the Natives could 
formulate their claims in a language familiar to them, and only their legal assistants 
translated them to Portuguese in their writings. Another barrier was that of the legal 
complexities. However, here an institution already known in the metropolitan legal 
                                                 
82
 Here, where I dedicate attention to procedure, I may not enter into the details of that interesting 
discussion of material law. 
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system helped: miserable and rural people (miserabiles and rustici) enjoyed certain 
procedural privileges, one of them being the right to get a curator ad litem to assist 
them. And the Native Americans were seen as an extreme case of poor peasants 
(Duve, 2008).  
In the Capitania of São Paulo, in 1741, Bartholomeu, “descendant of the 
Native heathen” (“oriundo do gentio da terra”), stated to be de jure an administrado, 
but in fact was exploited worse than a slave by Domingos Bicudo. To get free from the 
latter, he entered court, and asked to be taken away from Bicudo and deposited83. 
Therefore, he went less far as the case quoted by Acevedo (1599) suggested84, but 
even so his deposit meant a noticeable loosening of Bicudo’s grip. The very ambiguous 
function of a deposit gets clear when we compare Bartholomeu’s case with the 
following one. In the village of Itanhaem, Capitania of São Paulo as well, in the year 
1750, Antonio Vieira Callassa wanted to call Josepha de Oliveira, another “Native 
heathen”, into slavery. To prepare proceedings, he requested that Josepha, who lived 
on her own, should be arrested and deposited. This act clearly demonstrates how he 
already tried to treat her like his slave. Depending on the direction of the claim, a 
deposit could (symbolically as well as practically) diminish the “owner’s” rights or 
secure them. Nevertheless, Josepha’s attorney did not hesitate to react: Because 
proceedings began while she in fact stayed in liberty, so his argumentation, she had to 
be kept free, and even without even being obliged to provide bail85. The attorney 
nearly literally followed the opinion we have learned from Acevedo (1599): because 
there was a presumption that all men were born free, and because slavery had to be 
considered as odious, the libellant bore the onus of proof, and therefore could not 
request to have the defendant, a descendant of the notoriously free Natives, deprived 
of her liberty preliminarily86. The judge had her arrested and deposited anyway. An 
                                                 
83
 AESP proc. civ. ord. 3316, proc. 818, fol. 2, unfortunately without quoting any legal bases. 
84
 That seems to be a general phenomenon of the freedom trials of Native Brazilians. They were much 
more treated like the described metropolitan factual slaves, in procedural practice. 
85
 This latter obligation would only hit those, who struggled for freedom, living actually as slaves, thus 
the opposite case (“p[ar]a a Supp[lican]te dar fiança a sua pessoa devia estar na posse de cativa […]”, 
AESP, processos civeis, ord. 3412 proc. 3210, fol. 4, without any legal quotations).  
86
 Fol. 2 and 2 v: “[T]odos os homens por direito naçem livres e por t[ais] se devem ter todos, e a ser 
cativo, como co[usa] odioza a natureza p[ar]a hum se ter por tal, se deve pr[imeir]o provar com 
clareza e por esta razão não se pode mandar depozitar a Supp[lican]te por cativa, sem q[ue] prim[ei]ro 
probase a p[ar]te contr[ari]a q[ue] ella o era. Alem de q[ue] a Supp[lican]te descende do gentio da 
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exceptio87 followed immediately, called “de manutenção” by the lawyer, who argued 
that the possessory situation had to be maintained during the suit88, the judge’s 
contrary decision meant “espolio”89. Finally, Josepha won not only that preliminary 
question, but freedom as well. Her arrogated owner desisted, “in discharge of his 
soul”, confessing her natural liberty as a Native American.  
A very good example that sheds light on our question is the case of Joanna 
Pais and her children, also Native Americans, located at Santos90. They fled from the 
“administration”, exercised by the widow Isabel Pais de Guerra, before entering court 
to claim freedom. The attorney of the widow immediately reacted with an exceptio 
spolii91. The safe custody of the claimants, in the meantime realized at the house of a 
third person, in the eyes of the widow did not go far enough. Her administrados should 
return to her power (“a Ré seja restituida à posse em que se achava de sua 
administração das Autoras”), if not, they should not be allowed to continue 
proceedings – an obvious attempt to transform “administration” into a kind of true 
property, because only chattel could be possessed, not a free person. Exactly for that 
latter reason, the attorney of the administradas consequently countered, the 
exception had no point92. Again, the local judge decided against the Native claimants. 
He decided that they had to return to her administradora. The law, argued Joanna’s 
attorney, did not consider any tutor to have possession over the ward, and 
administration was more like tutelage than like ownership. However, things went 
                                                                                                                                               
terra, como hé publico, e ninguem disto duvida hé tambem notorio q[ue] o tal gentio hé forro e liberto 
[...].” 
87
 To get closer to the more recent language of US civil procedure, I suggest we maybe could translate 
this with objection. 
88
 The scarce legal quotations are not so interesting, though. At fol. 61 the lawyer quotes Morais (1742, 
book VI, chapter VII, §§ 2-4), who says that no execution could have place without a final judgement. 
Thus the lawyer interprets the capture of the Natives as an illegal measure of execution. He also 
quotes Mendes de Castro (1696, book 3, chapter 21, § 38), with the statement “in dubio possessor 
praesumitur esse dominus”. Here could have been quoted legal sources and opinions from more 
pertinent topoi.  
89
 Fol 10v, sic! The lawyer uses an intermediate form between the Latin spolium and the Portuguese 
esbulho. 
90
 APESP AC 3459, 448, from the year 1730.  
91
 He quoted among other authors, Gabrieli (1608, 494-495 [Lib. V, conclusio II]), Menochio (1687, de 
retinend. possess. remed. III, § 666, and de recuperand. possess. remed. XV).  
92
 “Dado porem, e não concedido que tivera a Administração nas AA exceytas, nunca em tempo Algum 
podia nellas, sendo livres, e libertas, adquirir Dominio, ou posse [...].” “Os Indios não se duvida que 
sejão livres, e S[e]n[ho]r[e]s de sua liberdade como qualquer outro homem logo tambem tem a posse 
della [...].” The lawyer quotes for example Pegas (1682, 2
nd
 part, chapter XI, § 201): “[S]poliatus non 
dicitur, qui possidere non potuit, nec possidet”.  
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poorly. While still under protective custody, the claimants received a sentence 
ordering then to return to the widow. While they prepared their appeal, the 
depositary wanted to be released from responsability so they were transferred to the 
local jail, but could return to safe custody at a private household after a period. Finally, 
the appeal was successful. The upper court at São Paulo declared them not only free, 
but also free from administration. Maybe a certain trend becomes apparent - that 
lower, local courts tended not only to decide against the plain liberty of Native 
Americans in their final sentences, but already in the preliminary procedural rulings 
tended to equal them with slaves, thereby favoring the endeavor of the settlers to 
mould administration into true property.   
More similar to the metropolitan situation was the procedural situation in 
cases involving slaves of African descent. The mandatum de manutenendo was 
applied93 and Brazilian lawyers sometimes quoted Roman law directly, to justify its 
injunction94. The solution to concede the litigants three days off was not uncommon95, 
but like their metropolitan counterparts, Brazilian “slaves” asked to be taken away 
from their mistresses or masters and put into safe custody, when they feared to be 
maltreated96 or to be sold far away97. In a case from Mariana, in the year of 1763, 
though, the lawyer tried to justify the measure as a development of the stilus98 of the 
Relação of Rio de Janeiro. In 1814, António José Carvalho Neto went to the court of 
                                                 
93
 Cf. one case of Ouro Preto of the year 1798 (Arquivo da Casa do Pilar (CP), Autos Cíveis, 1
o
 ofício, 
processo 221, 3580, fol. 2), the case of João from the year 1810 (Ouro Preto CP 1,188,2580 = AHCSM 
AC 2 [=2º ofício],[Códice]167,[Auto] 4001), or, from the same year, the case of Benedicta (AHCSM AC 
1, 413, 9018). From Imperial Brazil cf. the cases of Apolonia from the year 1823 (APESP Autos Cíveis, 
3422, 3387) or the case of Rosa (Rebola) from the year 1827 (Mariana AHCSM AC 1, 435, 9408, fol. 2), 
the case of João (Crioulo) of the year (1832), AHCSM AC 1, 405, 8851, the case of Eva Maria Ferreira 
from 1860 (AHCSM AC 2, 284, 6928), and the case of Ludivina (APEB SJ PC Est. 47, ex 1683 D 5, fol. 19).   
94
 For example in the case AHCSM AC 2, 281, 6876 (from the year 1795), fol. 13 v: D. 41.2.3.10 (first 
clause: “Si servus, quem possidebam, pro libero se gerat, ut fecit Spartacus, et iudicium liberale pati 
paratus sit, non videbitur a domino possideri, cui se adversarium praeparat.”).  
95
 For example in some cases of the town AHCSM AC, like the one of slave Pedro of the year 1795 
(AHCSM, AC 1, 392, 8572), or in 2
o
 oficio, 290, 7052 from 1795 as well, or in 1
o
 oficio 1, 420, 9137 of 
the year 1809.   
96
 Like the slave in a case of Ouro Preto of the year 1774 (of the local archive Casa do Pilar (CP), proc. civ. 
1
o
 ofício, 149, 1993) 
97
 As in AHCSM AC 2, 274, 6728 (of 1763): „[O] perigo he certo q[ue] pode a Sup[lica]da ser 
vindida“)Various of this risks are put foreward in AHCSM AC 2, 239, 5978 (of the year 1748), fol. 2: The 
owner would threaten them with torments, or he could imprison them to impede their litigation, or 
transport them far away to make it difficult (“com algum tormento ou os prenda captivos e lhes 
impeda poderem tratar de termos de sua cauza por qualquer das refferidas formas ou trespassando-
os para alguma parte por onde se lhe difficulta o progresso de tal cauza”).  
98
 AHCSM AC 2, 274, 6728, ibidem.  
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Mariana to combat the safe custody obtained by two of his slaves who had left him as 
an attack against his seigniorial rights99. He did not get them back, and they were 
transferred to a custodian more acceptable to him than the first one. Even in the 
colonial context, some judges seem to have been reluctant to have a person, who lived 
as free, but was claimed as slave, simply caught. In 1807 a claimant wanted to have the 
pardo Domingos arrested, of whom he said to be his slave, immediately in the act of 
summons, but the judge only summoned the defendant100. However, especially 
coartados, slaves who had been able to negotiate with their owners to buy their 
freedom by installments, were often simply arrested, when their owners argued, that 
they did not pay the sum in time101. When a slave stayed in the power of a dominus, a 
cautio de non offendendo of the latter could be required, or, alternatively, the judge 
would threat the dominus with a fine102. Last but not least, the exceptio spolii was also 
well known in Brazil and applied in status trials103.  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Maybe the strongest argument for the thesis of the lack of a rupture between 
(ancient and medieval) European and modern American slavery is the fact that the 
synopsis of the freedom trials of fifteenth century Valencia and of eighteenth century 
Minas Gerais did revealed nearly no difference. European erudite jurisprudence and 
colonial slavery were not worlds apart. The conservative (or rather reactionary) image 
                                                 
99
 AHCSM AC 2, 316, 7547.  
100
 AHCSM AC 2, 326, 7776, fol. 2. The claimant requested: “[P]or q[ue] o d[it]o Escr[av]o logo q[ue] for 
citado se pode abzentar p[ar]a parte remota, do qual não haja mais noticia, requer o Sup[licant]e q[ue] 
no acto de citação seja o mesmo aprehendido por officiaes de justiça, até q[ue] dê fiança segura de 
não fugir e ainda aos jornais p[o]r q[ue] só assim pode litigar solto [...].” But the judge only ruled: 
“P[asse] M[an]dado simplesm[en]te p[ar]a a Citação.“ 
101
 For example in a case from Mariana, of the year 1811 (AHCSM AC, 2
o
 ofício, cod. 412, n
o
 11991). 
102
 AHCSM AC 2, 262, 6460, do ano 1761 (mencionado também por Pinheiro, 2013, S. 204): „[Par]a não 
maltratar ao Sup[licant]e nem com elle entender té final S[e]n[ten]ça e sua Ex[ecuç]am debaixo da 
penna de mil oitavas de ouro [...] p[ar]a despezas da relação castigado como desobediente à justiça 
[...].” In the case, already mentioned, AHCSM AC 1, 420, 9137, fol. 81 (petição do 18 de novembro de 
1811), the litigating “slaves” had to serve their owner during three days of the week, but in the case of 
hard or unjust punishments or maltreatment, the owner should loose these three days (“a pena de 
perder as mais dias da semana, ou prestação dos serviços dos Sup[licant]es”).  
103
 See the case of Isabel (“mulata”) of the year 1740 (APESP 3327, 1163). The claimant claimed Isabel as 
his slave and had her imprisoned when starting a reivindicatio in servitutem against her. Her lawyer 
used the “exceyção de spolio”, quoting Dig. 40.12.10, D. 41.2.3.10 and Justinian Code 7.16.14 (fol. 19 
v); or the case of Josepha de Oliveira from the year 1750 (APESP AC 3412, 3210), whose lawyer also 
alleged “espolio” and formulated an “excepção”.  
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of slavery passed down by ancient legal semantics was a highly important factor in the 
formation of New World slave societies, and the centuries-old experience with slavery 
and slave law “in action” on the Iberian peninsula fostered a certain path-dependency. 
Due to the conservatism of the legal profession, voices that globally questioned the 
possibility to own human beings as property during medieval and early modern times 
were extremely rare. Colonial slavery was not shaped outside of courts, but largely 
inside of them. The state, in the form of colonial courts, did interfere into the master-
slave-relations, and did influence them decisively. Therefore, the responsibility of the 
“long robe” in prevented the spread of colonial slavery, by offering cultivated 
accompaying semantics (“gepflegte Begleitsemantik” as Luhmann would say), should 
not be overestimated. The space for customary law to develop, to the contrary, was 
minimal. As the transatlantic comparison shows, we cannot characterize the colonial 
Brazilian legal system as a hybrid one. The organization of justice in the colony 
reflected much more the dream of an “immense Portugal”, quite like in Chico Buarque 
de Holanda’s ironic “Fado Tropical”. We could even speak of a certain self-referentially 
of the legal system. As to the functioning of the colonial courts, once firmly 
established, they worked quite well and were not too much criticized by the 
metropolis. But there was definitely not a one-way-street of  the mere reception of 
European slave law by colonial legal professionals. They also influenced the 
development of metropolitan law, as in the case of Antonio Vanguerve Cabral, who 
acted as a judge in Brazil, but whose Pratica judicial (Cabral, 1727) became a very 
important legal book in the second half of the eighteenth century, and saw a re-edition 
in Lisbon in 1842104.  Finally, my findings reveal the strong continuity of the symbolic 
meaning of procedural incidents, by which the tensions between the principles of 
property and liberty expressed and discharged themselves, but also could be 
attenuated. In any case, by entering courts, slaves at all times opened a door that their 
masters and mistresses tried to keep closed. 
 
 
 
                                                 
104
 On the decentralized diffusion of legal production in the Spanish Empire see Duve (2012, p. 26-30), 
who rejects the idea of a mere reception of European legal thoughts in Latin America.  
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